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Abstract 
Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for 
childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, legal). The 
generalizability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to 
variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having 
been operationalized differently across studies and to differences in memory induction 
techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and 
developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation 
studies (N=423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the 
suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory 
statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified 
as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. 
When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not 
accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our 
research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not 
amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and 
associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date. 
 
Keywords: false memory, suggestion, mega-analysis 
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A Mega-analysis of Memory Reports from Eight Peer-reviewed False Memory Implantation 
Studies 
Memories are precious. They bond relationships, contribute to a sense of identity, and 
shape current decisions and future planning (Bluck, Alea, Habermas & Rubin, 2005; Brown, 
Schweickart, & Svob, 2016; Conway & Loveday, 2015; Pillemer, 1998). Memories may also 
seem eternal, like cherished photographs in an album we peruse from time to time. Our 
memories play major roles in making us who we are. Our beliefs about our personal histories 
both reflect and constitute central aspects of ourselves. Practitioners (e.g., police officers, 
medical personnel, career guidance counsellors, historians, political scientists), in a variety of 
everyday settings routinely rely on individuals’ autobiographical memory reports sometimes 
basing extremely consequential decisions on individuals’ reports of their personal histories. 
Yet remembering the past is a complex phenomenon that is subject to error (Schacter, 
2013). The malleable nature of human memory has led some researchers to argue that our 
memory systems are not oriented toward flawlessly preserving our past experiences. Indeed, 
many researchers now agree that remembering is, to some degree, reconstructive (Brewer, 1986). 
Current theories propose that our capacity to flexibly recombine remembered information from 
multiple sources—such as distributed memory records, inferences, and expectations—helps us to 
solve current problems and anticipate future events (Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Newman & 
Lindsay, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Szpunar, Addis, McClelland, & Schacter, 2010). 
One implication of having a reconstructive and flexible memory system is that people can 
develop rich and coherent autobiographical memories of entire events that never happened 
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). 
The existence of illusory autobiographical memories and false beliefs about the personal 
past has profound implications for psychology and for other disciplines. Thus it is crucial for 
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psychological scientists to understand the mechanisms that underlie the development of mistaken 
beliefs and illusory recollections and to address critical questions. For example, are there reliable 
ways to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate autobiographical reports? If so, are there 
ways to correct mistaken memories or to erase or at least disempower illusory memories? 
In this article, we revisit questions about the conditions under which participants in 
studies of false autobiographical memory come to believe in and remember fictitious childhood 
experiences. The study of false memories for autobiographical events in adults originally 
stemmed from concerns that suggestive therapeutic practices might foster the development of 
false childhood memories, particularly memories of abuse (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993; 
Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014). We now know that suggestive techniques can 
indeed lead people to develop detailed false autobiographical memories (Loftus & Bernstein, 
2005). Such false memories can affect people in a variety of ways, leading to changes in views 
of the self and views of others, and to changes in social behavior such as pursuing legal charges 
against a parent. Yet some memory-trauma therapists continue to use ‘memory recovery’ 
techniques that may put clients and their families at risk (Cara, 2014). Moreover, recent studies 
of mainstream clinicians and lay therapists show that many still hold inaccurate views about how 
memory works (Ost, Easton, Hope, French, & Wright, in press; Patihis et al., 2014).  
The most powerful procedure that researchers use to study the development of false 
childhood memories is variously called the ‘lost-in-the-mall’ (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), 
‘familial-informant false narrative’ (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004), or ‘memory 
implantation’ (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002) methodology. These studies typically 
merge suggestive techniques with social pressure to lead participants to report believing and 
remembering that a suggested pseudoevent had actually occurred. Briefly, in studies of this type 
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adult participants are told that the researchers are interested in how people recall childhood 
events. The participants are then presented with descriptions of a set of childhood events that 
were ostensibly provided by trustworthy family members (such as parents or siblings). Amongst 
these events is one false event created by the researchers (familial informants usually verify that 
to their knowledge the participant never experienced this event in childhood). Over two or three 
sessions – typically over the course of a week – participants are encouraged to recall the 
childhood events using various memory recovery techniques employed in trauma-memory-
oriented therapy (e.g., guided visualization). Researchers then assess the extent to which 
participants form false memories by the final interview session. This method remains the most 
rigorous experimental procedure for studying the creation of false autobiographical memories, 
and in this paper we use the term false memory to refer to the outcomes of this specific 
methodology, unless otherwise noted. We use the term false belief to identify the development of 
a belief that the suggested event occurred in the past, whether or not the person experiences a 
vivid memory of the event. 
The primary goal of memory implantation studies has been to establish which suggestive 
procedures enhance or inhibit false memory formation. To answer this question, researchers must 
determine when a false memory is present and estimate the frequency with which people form 
false memories under different conditions. To this end, researchers have proposed operational 
definitions for deciding when false memories have or have not developed. Independent judges 
typically read transcripts of participants’ memory reports and determine whether they have 
developed false memories according to a set of guidelines specific to the study. If judges 
disagree on a categorization they may categorise the response in the more conservative category 
or resolve the disagreement via discussion. Many studies also ask participants to rate the strength 
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of their memory and other variables related to the subjective experience of remembering (such as 
the extent to which they mentally relive the event as they bring it to mind, with varying degrees 
of sensory/perceptual, valence, and emotional qualities). Researchers sometimes use these 
subjective ratings to validate the judges’ categorizations.  
Although memory implantation studies have used these general procedures, the absolute 
rate of false-memory creation has varied dramatically across studies and across conditions. 
Among published studies involving healthy young adults, the rate of false recall has ranged from 
0%1 (Pezdek, Finger & Hodge, 1997) to 65% (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). It 
is likely that several different factors contribute to differences in the rate of false memories 
across studies. For example, the nature of the suggested event and the persuasiveness of the 
research assistant probably play roles. Another likely contributor, and a primary focus of this 
paper, is variation across studies in how false memories were operationalized. 
In the study we report here, we developed and implemented a new coding scheme for 
determining whether or not participants reported false memories. By using a single measurement 
tool to assess over 400 memory-report transcripts from eight published studies, we developed an 
improved estimate of the frequency with which false memories occurred. We also gained insight 
into the relative power of different suggestive techniques for creating false memories. Both of 
these outcomes will improve our understanding of the suggestive procedures and the 
mechanisms that underlie illusory memories and false beliefs. 
                                                          
1 The 0% memory formation reported by Pezdek, Finger & Hodge (1997) resulted when individuals were 
intentionally presented with a low plausibility event (receiving an enema) and interviewed by a sibling rather than a 
trained researcher; see Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & Relyea (2004), for personal plausibility ratings for ‘enema’ and 
other events. Low plausibility is associated with inhibition, but not elimination, of false belief and memory 
formation (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry & Shapero, 2012).  But unremembered childhood abuse is viewed as personally 
plausible by a sizeable minority of American undergraduates (Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2008), and the plausibility 
of initially low plausibility events can be increased (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). 
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Approach to Combining the Studies 
At first glance, it may appear that using meta-analytic procedures would be a valid 
approach to arrive at combined estimates of memory formation across studies. Indeed, meta-
analysis often affords powerful explorations of relationships between variables. But when 
combining studies it is critical that the dependent variables were measured in a sufficiently 
similar manner so that they can either be combined directly or placed onto standardized scales. 
For a variety of reasons this cannot be accomplished with memory implantation studies. 
The coding systems used to determine the prevalence and strength of false memories 
have varied widely across memory implantation studies. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
various ways in which researchers have operationalized false memory. It is clear from the table 
that the operationalizations draw on different dimensions. For example, some researchers only 
required that participants state that they remember the event, other researchers required that 
individuals provide details that extend beyond the suggested material, and still other researchers 
required that participants make a rating above a criterion on a self-report scale, to classify reports 
as false memories. Studies that have common dimensions often vary in the degree to which each 
dimension is emphasized. Furthermore, the highest category, often called ‘full’ or ‘clear’ false 
memories, is not defined consistently. The problem is compounded by the differential use of 
intermediate categories, such as ‘images without memories’ or ‘partial false memories’.  
These concerns are present even before we consider that multiple independent judges in 
different locations were tasked with categorising participants’ false memory reports. Judges do 
not always agree, for instance, on how to classify participants’ reports, and the exact procedures 
used for handling disagreements may lead to more or less conservative criteria being applied. 
Thus even when different labs use similar coding schemes, it is difficult to tell whether the 
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judges applied the coding scheme consistently. In short, false memories in memory implantation 
studies have been defined and measured in a variety of ways, which makes it difficult to 
determine just how prevalent they are across studies. 
Given the variation in coding schemes across studies, meta-analysis is not an appropriate 
approach for combining data from memory implantation studies. Indeed, there is currently no 
valid method for combining summary statistics originating from scales that differ in ways that 
are unknown. An alternative is to re-code the original data using a single validated system and to 
conduct a ‘mega-analysis’ of the resulting dataset. Mega-analysis involves the combination of 
participant level data from multiple studies and hence stands as a meta-analysis of individual 
data, which Olkin (1995) argued is the highest form of empirical evidence when combining 
studies. Providing that researchers have used the same dependent measures and are willing to 
share the raw data, mega-analysis has the advantage of accruing larger samples, thereby 
enhancing statistical power and permitting examination of research questions that cannot be 
addressed in individual, smaller studies. Mega-analysis has been increasingly used in areas such 
as genetics, neuroimaging, and treatment of psychopathology (e.g., de Maat et al., 2008; 
Hallahan, et al., 2011; see Sternberg et al., 2006, for a study of the effects of family violence on 
child behavior, in which combining data from multiple studies permitted asking of new 
questions).  Bernstein, Scoboria, and Arnold (2015) published a mega-analysis (8 studies; 
combined N = 1,369) of a different method that involves providing suggestions about false 
childhood food experiences. In the present study, we examined transcripts from false memory 
implantation studies at the participant level of analysis. 
Identifying false autobiographical memories 
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We grounded our definition of false memory in established theories of remembering 
(e.g., Brewer, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Ross, 1989; Rubin, 2006; Tulving, 1983). The 
experience of remembering a past event is the result of multiple cognitive systems and processes. 
Inputs from numerous sources (e.g., records of prior perceptual processing, of prior thoughts, 
feelings, general knowledge, beliefs, goals, feelings of familiarity, etc.) give rise to an experience 
of remembering the past. One key component is recollection, which involves the subjective 
experience of mentally reliving a past event. Mental representations experienced as recollections 
contain information about perception, place, actions, persons, and so forth. Another key 
component is belief in occurrence: remembering also entails the belief that an event genuinely 
occurred in one’s personal past (Brewer, 1996; Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). It is possible 
to believe that one experienced a particular event in the past without recollecting it (e.g., you 
believe that you were born although you don’t recollect the event). It is also possible to 
experience vivid recollections that are not believed to represent genuine past events (Scoboria et 
al., 2014). Thus definitions of false memory should address both belief about the occurrence of 
the suggested event and the subjective experience of recollecting the event. 
To develop our coding scheme for defining ‘false memory’, we began with these 
observations and with themes previously used in the literature. We chose seven concepts: [1] 
verbal statements of ‘remembering’; [2] acceptance of suggested information, which indirectly 
indicates a degree of belief in the occurrence of the event; [3] elaboration beyond suggested 
information, which indicates extension of a suggestion beyond acceptance of and compliance 
with suggested material; [4] presence and quality of mental imagery; [5] coherence of memory 
narratives; [6] evidence of emotional experience; and [7] no rejection of the suggested event. 
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Each of these dimensions could, we believed, be reliably assessed from the information available 
in transcripts of participants’ memory reports. We do not claim that these concepts represent a 
comprehensive list of the dimensions associated with remembering. Rather, we suggest that they 
adequately reflect current thinking about the characteristics of autobiographical memories, and 
that they are sufficient to determine the presence or absence of implanted memories. 
Statements of remembering. Some studies have used statements such as “I remember” to 
designate the presence of an implanted memory. Yet this criterion, alone, is insufficient. Just as 
the statement ‘I confess’ should not be used to infer that someone genuinely believes that he or 
she committed a crime (Kassin, 2012), the statement ‘I remember’ should not be used to infer 
that someone is indeed experiencing vivid recollection or belief that the event occurred in the 
past. Issues such as experimental demand and compliance with the research procedure may 
produce verbal reports that do not reflect peoples’ beliefs or recollective experiences about the 
past. 
A related concern is that people vary in the ways in which they talk about their memories, 
partly due to differences in how they have learned to communicate about the past (Fivush, 
Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011). Variability in linguistic usage leads to instances in which 
recollection may be present although the person does not appear to report recollection, or vice 
versa (see Otgaar et al., 2013). In short, verbal statements of remembering may be a starting 
point for identifying false memories, but alone are not adequate for determining that an event is 
remembered. 
Acceptance of the suggested event. At the start of false memory studies, participants 
typically initially indicate that they do not remember the suggested event. When a false event is 
first presented, some participants reject it outright, saying “No, that never happened to me.”  
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Often such people say something like, “That must have happened to my brother,” as a way to 
account for the belief that the informant wrongly claimed that the event happened to them. Such 
participants are unlikely to develop a memory of the false event unless they somehow come to 
accept that the suggested event occurred (Hyman & Kleinecht, 1999). People will not search for 
event-consistent thoughts and images or interpret them as memories of an event until they find it 
at least slightly plausible that the event could have transpired (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, & Shapero, 2012). The first step of the journey toward a false memory 
is some degree of acceptance that the suggested event could have happened. This may range 
from minimal acceptance of the possibility that the event may have occurred, to complete belief 
that the event definitely occurred (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, Lam, Hart & Schooler, 2006; Thomas 
& Loftus, 2002; see Scoboria et al., 2004, for more on the relationship between plausibility and 
autobiographical belief). The fact that acceptance is not explicitly stated as a criterion in some 
studies may reflect the questionable assumption that statements of remembering imply that 
someone has accepted the event.  
Elaboration beyond the suggestion. Many prior definitions of false memory require that 
participants elaborate beyond the details provided in the suggestion. Participants often embellish 
their reports with additional, event-relevant information and this elaboration provides some 
indication that participants are making an effort to remember and that they are not merely 
complying with experimenter demand. The source monitoring framework posits that people 
evaluate event-relevant information that comes to mind during attempts to remember to 
determine the extent to which that information resembles a genuine memory (Johnson et al., 
1993; Lindsay, 2008). Thoughts and images that arise from inference or imagination often retain 
the sense of having been internally generated (what the source monitoring framework terms 
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markers of effortful cognitive operations), but sometimes internally generated information is 
misattributed to past experience. Various aspects of the implantation procedure, such as telling 
participants that a family member provided the events, may encourage participants to lower their 
criteria for accepting internally generated thoughts and images as genuine memories (Wade & 
Garry, 2005). 
Self-generated event details can also lead to activation of additional relevant material in 
memory (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989) and to more frequent false memories (Hyman et al., 1995). 
Conversely, when people fail to retrieve sufficient information or retrieve event-inconsistent 
details, they may reject the event (Dodson & Schacter, 2001; Ghetti & Alexander, 2004; 
Lampinen & Odegaard, 2006). Hence elaboration beyond the details of the suggestion is an 
important facet of memory formation. 
Imagery. In many implantation studies participants are encouraged to create perceptual 
imagery for the false event. Imagery has long been associated with remembering (Brewer, 1996; 
Greenberg & Knowlton, 2014; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988), and the presence and 
strength of imagery is an important dimension to consider when examining memory formation. 
Theories of memory formation that build upon the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 
1993) posit that some suggestive practices foster the creation of imagery which may 
subsequently be misattributed to memory (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; Lindsay & Read, 1994). 
Recent findings support the view that the mental simulation of events recruits overlapping neural 
networks, regardless of whether those events are attributed to memory, to imagination, or to 
some other source (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser & Schacter, 2009; Schacter, Camberlain, Gaesser, & 
Gerlach, 2012). However the presence of vivid imagery alone is not indicative of recollection; 
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the imagery must also be attributed to prior experience (erroneously in the case of false 
memories). 
Narrative coherence. Rubin (2005) proposed that narrative is a key property of 
remembering that serves to organize autobiographical memory. Memories are frequently 
expressed in a narrative form, with a beginning and end, characters, settings, events, and so forth. 
Narrative is also the means by which memories for events are typically communicated. Thus the 
degrees to which memory reports appear to be complete, coherent, and thematically consistent 
are important dimensions of both the subjective and social aspects remembering (Brewer, 1986; 
Pillemer, 1998). 
People are also unlikely to accept suggested events as genuine past experiences if the 
events do not coincide with broader self-narratives. When people attempt to recall a past event, if 
a memory does not come quickly to mind they may try to identify the broad lifetime period and 
context that likely surrounded the event (Brown et al., 2016; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2001; 
Neisser, 1987). These more general details may then cue recollection for a specific episode. The 
more inconsistent an event is with one’s current self-views, however, the less likely a person is to 
accept thoughts, images and feelings that come to mind as evidence of remembering (cf. Ross, 
1989). Suggested events must make sufficient sense in relation to a person’s current perceptions 
of their past. When people view an event as being consistent with their personal history, their 
internal representation of the event is more likely to feel coherent. Moreover, when they talk 
about the event, others will judge it to be coherent as well. Thus narrative coherence should be a 
marker of the extent to which people accept, integrate, and elaborate on the suggested material to 
produce an integrated memory narrative (Neisser, 1994).  
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Emotion. Given that people experience emotional states when experiencing events, it is 
not surprising that people also recall past emotional states and experience emotional reactions 
when recalling events (Christianson & Safer, 1996). Based on findings that emotional intensity at 
retrieval is associated with strength of autobiographical memories (Talarico, LeBar, & Rubin, 
2004), we opted to code intensity of emotion in reports as an additional indicator of the 
development of false memories. 
No rejection of the suggested event. Participants in memory implantation studies are 
encouraged to construct vivid imagery while narrating aloud in order to retrieve unremembered 
events. In some cases individuals may provide an otherwise compelling report, but also make 
statements that indicate that they reject having any memory for the suggested event. It is obvious 
that such cases should not be categorized as false memories. 
Analytic approach  
To conduct the mega-analysis we solicited transcripts from published peer-reviewed false 
memory implantation studies. We developed and validated a system for coding false event 
narratives, and then applied the system to the transcripts from the studies. This approach 
permitted us to examine four novel outcomes. First, the combined dataset allowed us to take a 
data-driven approach to defining the presence of false memories. Second, we were able to 
combine memory formation rates across studies in a more valid manner. Third, the statistical 
power afforded by the larger dataset enabled us to examine the convergence between coded false 
memories and participants’ self-report ratings. Finally, we were able to explore what study 
characteristics were associated with false memory formation. 
Method 
Development of the coding system 
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Using the themes described above, we developed and validated a coding system for 
deciding when participants had experienced features associated with remembering. We created 
seven primary items (statements of remembering, acceptance, elaboration, imagery, coherence, 
emotion, and no rejection of the suggested event). For each dimension, raters used a 4-point 
rating scale, ranging from ‘not present’ to ‘highly present’. For three items (imagery, emotion, 
elaboration), raters first indicated whether the phenomenon was present or not, followed by 4-
point scaled questions about the amount and quality of the feature (imagery amount, imagery 
quality, emotion amount, emotion intensity, elaboration amount). We created an item to assess 
whether a memory was present based on the entire transcript (judged memory; rated no, 
yes/partial, yes/complete). The no rejection of suggested event item was rated as yes (rejected) or 
no (not rejected). We worded all items with an eye towards conceptual clarity and created an 
accompanying set of definitions for each item.  
Two assistants from the first author’s lab were trained in the use of the system. The raters 
worked with the authors to code event transcripts of true and false events from unpublished 
studies. We completed three cycles of coding and revising item wording until the raters provided 
consistent judgments. The same raters then independently coded a new set of 68 unpublished 
false memory transcripts (taken from pilot work and unfinished studies). We calculated the 
percentage of ratings that were identical between raters and examined frequencies for ratings that 
differed by two or more points on the scales, because these represent instances in which the 
raters read the transcript quite differently. We retained items with agreement above 70% and for 
which discrepancies between item ratings were less than two scale points in at least 90% of 
cases. See Table 2 for the final items. 
Obtaining and coding false memory transcripts 
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We approached researchers in Canada, New Zealand, the United States of America, and 
the United Kingdom who had published peer-reviewed memory implantation studies involving 
adult participants. We asked them to provide the anonymized, final-session transcripts for the 
false events from their published studies. The transcripts no longer existed for four published 
studies so we were unable to include data from these studies in our analyses (see the discussion 
below for further information about these studies). Ultimately we obtained transcripts from eight 
published studies involving a total of 423 participants: Desjardins and Scoboria (2007; N = 43; 
suggested event, trouble with teacher); Garry and Wade (2005; N = 44; hot air balloon ride); 
Hessen Kayfitz and Scoboria (2011, N = 81; hot air balloon ride); Hyman and Pentland (1996; N 
= 64; spilled punch bowl on parents of the bride at a wedding); Lindsay et al. (2004; N = 45; 
trouble with teacher); Ost et al. (2005; N = 26; one of eight events); Strange et al. (2008; N = 
100; hot air balloon ride); Wade et al. (2002; N = 20; hot air balloon ride). The distribution of 
gender across the total sample was 71.2% female, 25.9% male, 2.8% gender not recorded. Age 
was recorded for 65% of the sample; M = 20.7, range 17 to 42, SD = 2.9 (age was not available 
for the Hyman, Lindsay, or Ost studies but they too used university undergraduates as 
participants). We compared samples on the available demographic characteristics and found no 
statistically meaningful differences. 
To ensure that each item in the coding scheme was rated independently, we (AS, KW, 
SL/TA) trained separate pairs of raters to code each item. For example, one pair in AS’s research 
lab rated Elaboration, and another pair in KW’s lab rated Coherence, and so on. Pairs were 
trained in the use of an item and coded practice events using unpublished false memory 
transcripts until they achieved consistency of 75% or greater. Each pair then independently rated 
the 423 false memory transcripts. Initial inter-rater agreement was good: Elaboration – presence 
RUNNING HEAD: Mega-analysis of False Memory Reports… 17 
 
 
93.6%, amount 88.2%, relation 92.8%; Acceptance – 84.4%; Imagery – presence 90.7%, amount 
87.8%, quality 82.0%; Emotion – presence 94.2%, amount 72.0%, intensity 100%; Coherence – 
76.7%; Judge remembered – 79.7%; Statements of remembering, 100%; No rejection, 100%. 
Inconsistent ratings were resolved via discussion and in rare cases of continued disagreement the 
more conservative rating was selected. 
Defining ‘False Memory’ 
We explored criteria for defining when false memories were present. We began with the 
following two assumptions as discussed above. First, participants must accept the suggestion to 
some degree. Second, as participants move from saying ‘I do not remember that’ to ‘Now I 
remember…’, they must report additional imagery or otherwise elaborate beyond the suggested 
material. Of course, the extent to which these characteristics need to be present to define a 
participant’s report as a memory remains an open question. 
Correlations and 95% confidence intervals between judges’ acceptance, elaboration, 
imagery, and judged memory ratings are provided in Table 3. Acceptance showed the highest 
relationship with judgments of memory, consistent with the idea that a degree of acceptance of 
the suggestion is a necessary dimension in memory formation. The high correlation (.73) 
between ratings of imagery and elaboration suggests that these concepts reflect highly 
overlapping aspects of the reports. In light of these relationships and the preceding discussion, 
we developed definitions of “false autobiographical memory” that focussed on the extent to 
which participants accepted the suggested event. 
Next we examined various combinations of the acceptance, elaboration, and imagery 
variables, and the associated mean ratings on other judged variables (emotion engagement, 
coherence, and judged memory) for each combination. Table 4 displays the cumulative 
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frequencies for each combination. The first row includes cases for which acceptance of the 
suggestion was coded as zero. The ratings for all variables in this group were extremely low. The 
second row includes cases in which any level of acceptance was present, and subsequent rows 
incorporate higher levels of acceptance and introduce different levels of elaboration and imagery.  
The item means indicated a difference between any acceptance and moderate acceptance 
of the event. Based on this observation and the idea that memories typically include a degree of 
acceptance of the event plus a memory-like image and elaboration beyond the suggested 
material, we placed the minimal criterion for presence of a memory as moderate acceptance plus 
any level of both elaboration and imagery (Table 4, row 4). For the cases classified as memories, 
increasing the thresholds for elaboration and imagery from any to moderate resulted in notable 
increases in scores. Thus we used this threshold to differentiate between two groups of false 
memories. The first group was named “partial false memory” (moderate acceptance with any 
elaboration and any imagery) to reflect strong acceptance but lesser presence of other key 
features associated with memory. The second group was named “full false memory” (moderate 
acceptance with moderate elaboration and moderate imagery, row 5), to indicate that all key 
features were present. We defined those cases judged with a high level of acceptance of the 
suggestion and moderate imagery and elaboration as “robust false memory” (row 6). In previous 
studies, false memories were classified as either partial or full. Combining the full and robust 
categories would be similar to the full memories from earlier studies. One advantage of this 
mega-analysis is the finding that false memories represent a continuum in terms of acceptance 
and elaboration. With the mega-analysis, we were able to differentiate that even within the group 
of false memories typically classified as full memories, there are many that display a much 
greater degree of acceptance and elaboration. Regardless of whether the event met the criteria for 
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partial, full, or robust false memory, if the participant stated at the end of the interview that s/he 
did not have a memory of the event, we coded the event as ‘rejected.’ This resulted in the 
following categories: rejected, no memory, accepted (to some degree), partial false memory, full 
false memory, and robust false memory. 
Results and Discussion 
False memory formation across studies 
When we categorized the 423 memory reports according to the scheme described above 
(see Figure 1), 11.1% of the sample met the criteria for Robust memory, 10.8% met the criteria 
for Full memory, and 8.5% met the criteria for partial false memory, resulting in a combined 
false memory rate of 30.5%. Of the remainder, 23.0% were judged as having accepted the 
suggestion as true to some degree but did not meet the criterion for remembering. Another 10.4% 
were judged as having strong mental representations but the participant explicitly rejected having 
a memory. For 36.2% there was no evidence of acceptance of the suggestion or memory 
formation. Thus, approximately one-third of participants showed evidence of a false memory, 
and more than half showed evidence of believing that the event occurred in the past. 
Statements of remembering the suggested event 
 As we noted previously, relying on participants’ verbal utterances of remembering (e.g., 
“I remember being lost…”) to determine remembering is problematic. For this reason, we did not 
include statements of remembering in our definition of false memories. We did, however, 
calculate the percentage of participants in each memory category who made clear statements of 
remembering. In the Full and Robust categories, 91.2% (n = 85) of cases included a statement of 
remembering. Of the eight cases that did not include such a statement, in six cases the participant 
spoke in ways that appeared to reflect remembering but did not use explicit language indicating 
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such. For the remaining two cases, the participants shifted into describing the event in the 
historical present at some point in the narrative (e.g., “I bump into the table with my shoulder, 
and the bowl moves…”), which has been associated with the experience of remembering 
(Pillemer, 2003). 
In the Partial memory category, 36.1% (n = 13) of participants made statements about 
remembering. Some participants spoke vaguely, which may have made their transcripts more 
difficult to classify. Other participants explicitly expressed an incomplete sense of remembering, 
and often indicated that they were retrieving fragments of memories or were vividly seeing 
isolated details in their mind. As such, they went beyond speculation to express a partial sense of 
remembering. Thus some of these cases may reflect full memories, but due to their ambiguity 
they were appropriately coded into the more conservative category. 
For the Acceptance category, 8.2% (n = 8) of cases made statements of remembering. Of 
these, two participants were uncertain if the memory originated in the suggested event or another 
experience; another two could be interpreted as either indicating imagining or remembering; and 
for four cases the transcripts presented a mixture of both memory claims and denial of memory. 
In the No Memory category, no cases were rated as providing statements of remembering.  
There are three points to note here. First, participants’ statements of remembering 
corresponded well, but not perfectly, with our criteria for defining false memories. Participants 
categorized as having full or robust false memories almost always made statements about 
“remembering” the event. Second, our criteria appropriately and conservatively allocated 
participants with vague or fragmented memory representations into the partial memory group. 
Finally, a notable minority of participants did not make explicit statements of remembering but 
still may have remembered the suggested event. 
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Relationship of additional judged items to false memory status 
Judges rated the characteristics of the 423 reports on six additional items that were not 
used to determine the false memory categories: emotion amount, emotion intensity, coherence, 
elaboration relationship (how closely the additional information was to the original event), 
imagery quality, and judged memory (whether the rater thought that the participant ‘felt like’ 
they had a memory). Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for these items, by the false memory 
categories defined above. We use 95% confidence intervals to discuss differences on these items 
between the memory categories (Cumming, 2013). We focus on the ‘No-memory’ to ‘Robust’ 
memory categories first, then examine the ‘Rejected’ category separately below. We found a 
strong convergence between the memory categories and the judges’ ratings on all six items. For 
example, reports that were categorized as Robust false memories scored higher on the six items 
than reports categorized as Full. The rank order of the categories was consistent across all items, 
with means going from lowest to highest value from the No memory to the Robust category; 
although some items did not significantly differ across categories. Contrasting the contiguous 
groups, the Full and Robust categories were differentiated only by the coherence and judged 
memory items. The Partial and Full categories were differentiated by the coherence, imagery 
quality, and judged memory categories. The Accept and Partial categories were differentiated by 
coherence, elaboration relationship, imagery quality, and judged memory. Finally, the No 
memory and Accept categories were differentiated by all items except emotion engagement.  
To summarize, mean ratings for all items increased numerically across the No-memory to 
Robust categories, respectively. Coherence ratings differentiated all categories, and Imagery 
Quality and Judged Memory ratings differentiated a number of categories. 
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Rejected category. Participants in the Rejected memory category (10.4% of the sample) 
were coded as having vivid mental representation for the suggested event, but ultimately rejected 
remembering the event. Not surprisingly, Judged Memory ratings for these participants were 
invariably zero. This group’s ratings for elaboration relationship resembled those who were 
deemed to have Full or Robust memories, which is consistent with the argument that these 
reports look like vivid memories to an observer. Emotion and imagery quality in the Reject 
category resembled the Partial category, whereas coherence ratings for the Rejected category 
were lower than those for the Partial category. The pattern of ratings in the rejected category is 
interesting in that they highlight the difficulty that judges face in 1) determining when someone 
is remembering an event, and 2) determining the underlying psychological basis for such 
memory statements. 
Participants’ subjective ratings for suggested events 
We now turn to participants’ responses to self-report items, which can serve as another 
method for validating judges’ ratings. In memory implantation studies, participants are often 
asked to rate the phenomenological characteristics of their memory reports, such as the extent to 
which they see the event in their mind or relive the original emotions associated with the event. 
These ratings enable participants to convey their subjective sense of remembering. The self-
report items used most frequently across the eight studies included: visual imagery, auditory 
imagery, emotional intensity, narrative coherence, remember/know, prior instances of rehearsal, 
confidence in memory, and belief in the accuracy of memory. We contrasted our memory 
categories using the self-report items that were completed by at least 50% of the combined 
sample. Three items met this criterion: [1] Remember/know (75.9%), [2] Rehearsal (75.9%), and 
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[3] Reliving (58.6%). Figure 2 shows the mean rating for these items according to memory 
category. 
Remember/know and reliving. Remember/know was measured on a 7-point scale, and 
assessed the degree to which participants’ episodic recollection was associated with an event 
versus knowing that an event happened without associated recollection; recent research has 
found that this item is an excellent marker of subjective recollective experience (Scoboria et al., 
2014). Reliving assesses the extent to which the event representation is associated with an 
experience of reliving the event, and was also measured on a 7-point scale. Reliving and 
Remember/know ratings were lowest in the Reject and No Memory groups, were somewhat 
higher (differing from the scale floor) in the Accept and Partial groups, and were notably higher 
in the Full and Robust groups. We calculated standardized effect sizes to contrast the No 
Memory group to the combined Accept/Partial groups (R/K, d = 0.38 [95% CI .11, .65]2; 
Reliving, d = 0.57 [.26, .89]), No Memory to the combined Full/Robust groups (R/K, d = 1.29 
[.97, 1.61]; Reliving, d = 1.34 [.99, 1.69]), and the combined Accept/Partial groups to the 
combined Full/Robust groups (R/K, d = 0.92 [.60, 1.24]; Reliving, d = 0.76 [.39, 1.12]). The 
agreement between the coded ratings and these subjective ratings provides evidence of 
convergent validity for our coding system. 
Rehearsal. The rehearsal item assesses how frequently participants thought or talked 
about an event in the past on a 7-point scale. Because the suggested event is novel, ratings on this 
item should be low. This was the case, except that the Robust memory group showed a weak 
endorsement of the item. Those in the Robust memory group may have given slightly higher 
ratings due to having thought about the event more during the study. 
                                                          
2 Confidence intervals on Cohen’s d were calculated using the SPSS macro by Wuensch (2012). 
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Study characteristics and false memory   
Within the memory implantation literature over time we see the emergence of increasingly 
powerful techniques for fostering false memories. We examined the correlation between the 
judged ratings and factors that varied across conditions within and between the eight studies. 
Table 6 shows the judged items and how each item correlated (and associated 95% confidence 
intervals) with three factors that showed statistically meaningful relationships: [1] Providing 
participants with idiosyncratic self-relevant information (e.g., including details in suggestions 
such as the name of an actual teacher), [2] Encouraging participants to imagine the suggested 
event during testing sessions, and [3] Using doctored photographs to depict the suggested event. 
We also examined whether providing participants with both a narrative and a photo was related 
to memory rates, and did not find any meaningful correlations (range - .07 to .05). Whether 
significant or not these correlations must be interpreted with caution due to the presence of 
multiple confounds. Nonetheless, they offer some intriguing leads, as detailed below. 
Providing self-relevant information. Desjardins and Scoboria (2007) proposed that studies 
with higher false memory rates provide participants with idiosyncratic self-related information 
within the suggestion, and they reported a study that yielded support for that hypothesis. We 
coded whether idiosyncratic information was (6 studies, N = 1743) or was not (5 studies, N = 
249) provided to participants. The presence of idiosyncratic information correlated positively 
with all of the judged categories except for emotional experience. The correlations ranged from 
.16 (elaboration relationship, judged memory) to .30 (imagery amount). Idiosyncratic self-
relevant information appears to enhance visual imagery, increase elaboration on suggested 
material, and foster a cohesive narrative. The false memory rate (Robust, Full, and Partial 
                                                          
3 Some published papers contribute cases to both categories due to the manipulation of variables within studies. 
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combined) was 39.6% [95% CI: 32, 47] when self-relevant information was present, and 24.0% 
[19, 30] when it was not; propdiff = .24 [.07, .24].  
Instructing participants to imagine. Many researchers have discussed the influence of 
imagination and of vivid imagery on memory formation (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni & 
Memon, 2003). We coded whether participants were (6 studies, N = 265) or were not (3 studies, 
N = 158) encouraged to systematically imagine the suggested event during the study procedure. 
Instructions to generate imagery correlated positively with all of the judged variables. Most of 
the correlations fell between r = .21 and .28, indicating weak but reliable relationships. The 
correlation with the Coherence item was somewhat higher at r = .38. The false memory rate was 
37.3% [95% CI 32, 43] when imagery was present in the procedure, and was 19.0% [13, 25] 
when it was not; propdiff = .19 [.10, .26]. The imagery procedures used in implantation studies 
tend to be fairly elaborate. Participants are typically given instructions for context reinstatement 
and then guidance in imagining specific details of events. Thus we cannot determine exactly 
which aspects of these procedures contribute to false memory formation. 
Providing photographs depicting suggested events. There is evidence that the medium in 
which the suggested event is presented can also influence the rate of false recall. For instance, 
Garry and Wade (2005) found higher rates of false memory formation when participants were 
presented with a description of the false event rather than a doctored photograph of the false 
event. Garry and Wade concluded that such photos may serve to constrain imagination during 
efforts to recall the event, thus leading to lower memory formation. We coded whether 
participants viewed (4 studies; N = 170) or did not view (6 studies; N = 253) a photo that 
allegedly depicted the specific suggested event. Consistent with their argument, weak but 
statistically reliable negative relationships emerged for Coherence (r = -.12), Imagery Amount (r 
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= -.19) and Imagery Quality (r = -.16). The false memory rate was 25.9% [95% CI 20, 32] when 
a photo depicted the event and 33.6% [28, 40] when no such photo was presented; propdiff = .08 
[.00, .16]. One caveat worth noting is that only one event (hot air balloon ride) and the same or a 
similar photo has been used in all of the studies that have provided a doctored photo of the event. 
Combining self-relevant information, imagination, and photos. To examine the combined 
power of these techniques (providing self-relevant information, encouraging imagining, 
presenting a suggested narrative without a photo depicting the event), we contrasted study 
conditions in which all three procedures were present (3 studies; N = 89) against all other 
observations (7 studies; N = 334). The false memory rate was 46.1% [95% CI 36, 56] when the 
three conditions were present and 26.3% [22, 31] for when they were not; propdiff = .20, [.09, 
.31]. As Figure 3 shows, the main difference is that participants in the studies that met those 
conditions were more often judged to have formed ‘Full’ false memories.  
These three suggestive techniques — self-relevant information, imagination, and narratives 
without photos — might work in concert as follows: The presence of self-relevant information 
may enhance a participant’s belief that the suggested event occurred, encouraging efforts to 
recall it.  Self-relevant information may also provide participants with an effective memory cue. 
This may create an environment that is ripe for thoughts, images, and feelings to come to mind, 
and may bias participants toward accepting them as memories.  Participants may embellish those 
mental experiences as they repeatedly imagine the suggested event. Moreover, if participants are 
provided with a verbal description of the suggested event, rather than a doctored photo that 
depicts precisely how the event occurred, they also have free rein to imagine. Together these 
processes may encourage participants to develop perceptually rich and vivid mental experiences 
that they ultimately misinterpret as memories of the suggested event. We note, however, that our 
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results must be interpreted with caution, because participants were not randomly assigned to 
these different suggestive conditions and there were confounding differences between the studies 
that did versus did not combine suggestive techniques. 
False Autobiographical Belief 
 To this point, our examination of the data has emphasized false memories. However, 
many theories of false memory formation state that false autobiographical beliefs are a step along 
the path to the development of a false recollection. Coming to believe an event is a genuine part 
of the past is sufficient to lead to changes in views of the self and behavior (e.g., Mazzoni & 
Kirsch, 2002). The findings in Bernstein et al. (2015) indicate that once an event is sufficiently 
believed to have occurred, development of recollection does not contribute further to behavioral 
outcomes. In other words, belief in the occurrence of an event may be sufficient to influence 
behavior, whether or not there is also an accompanying episodic recollection. 
Given the relevance of the development of false autobiographical belief to understanding 
the effects of suggesting events, we report here on subjective autobiographical belief ratings that 
were taken in two of the samples (N = 116; Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Hessen Kayfitz & 
Scoboria, 2012). The average belief in occurrence rating (1 to 8 point scale) following the 
implantation procedure across all individuals was 4.71 (95% CI 4.23, 5.19). The average belief 
rating did not differ statistically across the false memory categories discussed above (none, 
accepted, partial, full, robust, rejected). As can be seen in the frequency distribution in Figure 4, 
the distribution of scores was not normal. While 50% of individuals rated autobiographical belief 
above the scale midpoint, 28% reported autobiographical belief at the top of the scale. This 
pattern indicates that implantation procedures promote a notable degree of false belief formation 
in a majority of participants, and that a high level of belief is not uncommon following these 
RUNNING HEAD: Mega-analysis of False Memory Reports… 28 
 
 
procedures. The level of autobiographical belief results from the procedure regardless of the 
degree of development of false recollection, which varies across the false-memory categories as 
discussed above in the analysis of reliving and remember-know ratings (see Scoboria, Wysman, 
& Otgaar, 2012, for further discussion). 
Summary 
 In this mega-analysis, we systematically applied the same coding system to over 400 
memory reports from previously published false memory implantation studies. This method 
afforded us the statistical power necessary to ask more refined questions that have only been 
speculated about in prior work. Setting methodological differences between the eight target 
studies aside, across studies 30.4% of participants were classified as having developed a false 
memory, and 53.3% were judged to have accepted the suggested event as genuine to some 
degree (inclusive of those classified as having developed a false memory). The presence of 
idiosyncratic self-related information, an imagination procedure during the suggestion, and to a 
lesser extent presenting the suggestion without a photo depicting the specific event, were each 
associated with high memory formation rates. Given all three of these conditions we found a 
false memory rate of 46.1% and an acceptance rate of 69.7%.   
Consistent with models of false memory formation (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; 
Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004), our analysis shows that if 
a false event is suggested, if evidence is provided that the event occurred, if resistance to 
considering the possibility that the event occurred can be overcome, and if imagination is 
employed, then false autobiographical memories often arise. Furthermore, suggestive practices 
appear to instill a degree of belief in false events in about two-thirds of study participants, and 
autobiographical belief ratings are often high following the procedure. Although implantation 
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studies have largely been concerned with illusory autobiographical memories, on an applied 
level false autobiographical beliefs may be more important. Bernstein et al. (2015) recently 
presented evidence that it may be changes in autobiographical belief that underpin changes in 
suggestion-related attitudes and behavioral intentions.  
Our purpose here is not to review the extant body of research relevant to false memories, 
and we remind readers that the memory implantation methodology emphasized here is just one 
method in a rich body of research on memory errors. Distinct experimental methods, 
correlational studies, case reports, and anecdotal reports converge to show that people can come 
to remember false memories for personally meaningful past events. While the implantation 
method remains the most compelling experimental method for demonstrating and manipulating 
the formation of rich autobiographical false memories, a complete understanding of the 
processes that contribute to memory formation must be based in a wider reading of the literature. 
For that purpose, we direct readers to Schacter, Chamberlain, Gaesser, and Gerlach (2012), 
Laney and Loftus (2013), and Loftus (2005) for reviews. 
One important finding here is that a memory report can look like a genuine memory to 
observers, even if the person does not explicitly report remembering the event. Indeed, 10% of 
participants in our combined sample appeared to have strong episodic mental representations of 
the suggested event, but ultimately reported that they did not remember it. This finding is 
important for at least two reasons. First, people may not experience recollection even though 
their reports meet coding criteria, and conversely, people may experience recollection when their 
reports do not meet the criteria (see also Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013). The disconnect 
between a participant’s reported subjective experience and the criteria being applied can lead to 
the over- or under-reporting of false memory rates. Second, so-called objective judgments of 
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events as recollected may not coincide with participants’ subjective experience of remembering. 
Given these complications, the elicitation and classification of reports (and the underlying 
cognitive states that contribute to them) must be examined carefully. Most memory implantation 
studies have mechanisms built in to ensure that false memory estimates are appropriate. For 
instance, many studies have distinguished between participants who report images only and 
those who report memories. In most studies, independent judges are trained to look for clear 
evidence of remembering, and disputes between judges are usually classified into the more 
conservative category. Finally, some studies, including this one, have documented convergence 
between the judges’ memory categorizations and participants’ self-ratings. Together, these 
procedures help to minimize the likelihood of coding error. Methodologically, our findings 
reinforce the importance of obtaining clear and elaborate statements from participants about what 
they remember and what they believe about suggested events (see Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2009, for an excellent example of the value of clarifying memory claims). 
One conclusion that can be made based on this study and on similar work is that it can be 
difficult to objectively determine when someone is recollecting the past, versus reporting other 
forms of knowledge or belief or describing mental representations that have originated in other 
sources of experience. Even under highly controlled laboratory conditions, memory researchers 
struggle to define and observe memory. How, then, can we expect therapists, forensic 
investigators, medical personnel, human resource staff, or jurists to be any better at this task? 
Potential limitations 
Study selection. We included published false memory implantation studies with adults 
conducted in English that we could obtain at the time that we conducted the project. We chose to 
include published studies that had passed the peer review process. We did not include studies 
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that examined the development of false memories in children due to the need to consider 
developmental differences with child participants, and because few studies that used the 
implantation procedure with children were available when we began the project. Beyond the 
eight studies included here, we were unable to obtain information from four published studies for 
which the researchers indicated that the transcripts no longer existed (Heaps & Nash, 2001; 
Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). 
The total N from those studies was 221 (range 20 to 77); and the false memory rates reported 
ranged from 20% to 56% (weighted average 39.5%). 
Of course, publication bias is likely to have affected the effect sizes we report here. We 
were not aware of any unpublished false memory implantation studies that met our criteria and 
for which transcripts existed at the time of our analysis. Nonetheless, to minimise selection bias, 
we included all of the participants who took part in the eight target studies in our analyses, 
regardless of the condition to which they were assigned. The target studies also varied in their 
intention to promote false memory development; for instance, some conditions served as controls 
and other conditions were expected to produce minimal development or even inhibit false 
memory formation. For this reason, one should not interpret the percentages of memories 
classified as partial, full, and robust as representing some limit in the level of false memory 
creation.  
The retrieval of genuine events. Some participants in implantation studies who appear 
to have false memories may be retrieving genuine memories of past experiences (e.g., perhaps 
the participant really did experience a hot-air balloon ride). But there are several reasons to 
believe that such cases are rare. First, the critical events used in memory implantation studies are 
often the kinds of events that would have required parental permission or guidance, yet parents 
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indicate that the event never occurred. Other critical events are so peculiar and distinctive – such 
as putting slime in a teacher’s desk (Lindsay et al., 2004) or spilling a bowl of punch on a bride 
(Hyman & Pentland, 1996) – that it is not plausible that many participants had experienced those 
events. Even if some participants had experienced a similar event the suggested false event is 
unlikely to perfectly match in terms of the exact age and manner with any genuine childhood 
experience. Second, several studies using different procedures have addressed this issue directly 
by showing that people can develop distorted beliefs and memories about highly implausible or 
impossible events (Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002; Mazzoni, Loftus & Kirsch, 2001; Mazzoni & 
Memon, 2003; Spanos, Burgess, Burgess, Samuels, & Blois, 1999). One procedure used to 
address such concerns in memory implantation studies is to ask participants’ family members 
whether, to their knowledge, the participants ever experienced the false event(s). All eight of the 
studies included in our analysis included this step for verifying that the false event never 
occurred. While it is an important step, we acknowledge that parents/siblings can only provide 
information that is, to the best of their knowledge, true. We cannot assume that just because an 
informant indicates that their child never experienced an event that in fact their child never had a 
related experience. Finally, research suggests that people incorporate details from a variety of 
cognitive processes, such as imagination, guided-imagery, and genuine memories, to construct 
memories of suggested events (Wade et al., 2002). It is simply incorrect to state that false 
memories are entirely false (Lindsay & Read, 1995; Read & Lindsay, 1994) and many false 
memories are likely to be built from elements of genuine experiences (Hyman et al., 1995).  
We reiterate that a complete understanding of errors in autobiographical memory requires 
a broader reading of the literature. The memory implantation procedure focused on in this paper 
is complemented by laboratory-based methods in which researchers have control over the events 
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that are recalled. For example, Goff and Roediger (1996) described a method for inducing false 
memories for actions performed in the laboratory, and their approach has been further adapted by 
others (e.g., Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2013; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009; Seamon, 
Philbin, & Harrison, 2006; Thomas & Loftus, 2002). One important trade-off between the 
implantation procedure and laboratory procedures is ecological validity, because the events used 
in controlled laboratory studies do not resemble autobiographical memories in their full 
complexity. We also emphasize that our focus is on the development of false memories, and not 
on the issue of retrieval of true memories. 
Implications 
 This research demonstrates the value of identifying situations in which formal or informal 
meta-analytic reviews are inappropriate for making summary statements about the state of 
knowledge within a literature. We offer an example of how to conduct integrative analyses in 
which measurement is reconceptualised in a theoretically informed way that allows data to be 
combined across diverse studies. In contrast, Brewin and Andrews (2016) recently reviewed 
false memory implantation research in what we perceive to be an example of what should not be 
done when attempting to summarize this literature. While they stated that they were not 
attempting to conduct a meta-analysis, they did report summary estimates of, for example, false 
memory formation rates. By averaging across studies and conditions, Brewin and Andrews 
concluded that the false memory formation rates across extant studies is no higher than 15%. 
They did acknowledge a number of potential moderating variables, but they then ignored the 
influence of such moderators on memory formation and, crucially, implied that their 15% 
estimate is a universal limit that generalizes to real-world cases. Our perspective is more modest 
and situationally grounded. Our estimate of the rate of false memories across the eight studies 
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analyzed here was substantially higher than 15%. But our broader point is that the likelihood of 
false memories depends on interactions between many variables. Under some conditions, false 
memories of various kinds are very rare, and under others they are very common. Psychologists 
are a long way from having a complete understanding of how the relevant variables interact to 
determine the likelihood and nature of false-memory experiences, but mega-analyses such as this 
may help us develop such an understanding. (For further discussion of Brewin and Andrew’s 
analyses and conclusions, see Lindsay & Hyman, in press; Nash, Wade, Garry, Loftus, & Ost, in 
press; McNally, in press; Otgaar, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, in press; Pezdek & Blandon-
Gitlin, in press; Scoboria & Mazzoni, in press; Smeets, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Otgaar, in press). 
To conclude, research on false memory formation originated in criticisms of the notion 
that suggestive therapeutic practices were specifically and reliably linked to the recovery of 
genuine memories (Lindsay & Read, 2001). Despite a substantial body of evidence that 
suggestive practices promote the development of false memories, these notions remain prevalent 
in North America (Patihis et al., 2014) and in the UK (Ost et al., 2013). Our results firmly 
support the assertion that suggesting false events can produce false memory in a substantial 
percentage of people. On the one hand, it is likely to be more difficult to lead people to develop 
false beliefs or memories of childhood sexual abuse than of, say, a childhood prank. On the other 
hand, participants in the studies reviewed here were undergraduate students and the suggestive 
pressures brought to bear were brief and relatively mild. With stronger techniques combining the 
factors we investigated, more people may be led to create false memories of negative 
experiences. Moreover, people struggling with psychopathology who seek help for their 
symptoms may be particularly vulnerable to suggestions, and some trauma-memory-oriented 
‘treatments’ use much more extensive procedures (psychopharmacology, hypnosis, pressure to 
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recall, elaborate explanations of memory repression and memory recovery, exposure to 
autobiographies in which memory has been ‘successfully recovered’, and so forth), often with 
greater frequency and over longer periods of time. We are hopeful that the use of dangerously 
suggestive practices has declined over the last two decades, but some treatment providers 
continue to use these practices (see Cara, 2014, for a recent case). Memory implantation research 
has already contributed to changing practice and policy by psychotherapists and by individuals 
who conduct forensic interviews. Our results reinforce how important is it to continue educating 
people about the malleability of memory.   
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Table 1. Definitions of categories in false memory implantation studies conducted with adults.  
 
Study Category Definition (Quotations taken from published papers) 
Loftus & Pickrell (1995) Full false memory [no definition provided] 
Partial false memory “partial memories included remembering parts of the event and speculations about how and when it might have happened” 
*Hyman & Pentland 
(1996); [Hyman, 
Husband, & Billings 
(1995); Hyman & Billings 
(1998)] 
Clear false memory “reports of spilling the punch, consistent elaborations, and statements that the event was a memory” 
Partial false memory “consistent elaborations with some statements of remembering but did not include memory of actually spilling the punch” 
Trying to remember “described an image or reported related self-knowledge, but made no clear claims to remember the event” 
Pezdek, Finger & Hodge 
(1997) 
Remembered “An event was operationally defined as remembered if the subject recalled specific details of the event that were not 
included in the description read” 
Porter, Yuille, & Lehman 
(1999) 
Implanted memory “reported remembering the suggested event; …agreed with and/or incorporated the information clues into the memory 
report; …reported more information than the four information clues (prompts)” 
 Partially implanted “recalled information or imagery pertaining to the event, but never recalled it in its entirety or was unsure whether the 
memory was real” 
Heaps & Nash (2001) False memory “given a rating of 1-4 on the following question by participants… How much of the event do you remember? (0 None, 1 
little, 2 some, 3 most, 4 all), and subsequently remembered content could not be verified by parents as having happened” 
*Wade, Garry, Read, & 
Lindsay (2003) 
Clear false memory “report memories of the critical balloon ride, including consistent elaboration of information not depicted in the photograph” 
Partial false memory “consistently elaborated… but did not indicate memories of taking the balloon ride per se”  
Trying to remember “tried to recall the false event and described images of it but did not claim these images as memories” 
*Lindsay, Hagen, Read, 
Wade, & Garry (2004); 
[*Desjardins & Scoboria 
(2007); *Hessen-Kayfitz 
& Scoboria (2012)] 
False memories “if the subject appeared to believe that s/he was remembering the suggested event” 
Images but not 
memories 
“described images associated with the suggested event but did not appear to experience those images as memories of the 
event” 
*Garry & Wade, 2005 False memory “report remembering the false event and details about the event that were not depicted in the doctored photograph or 
outlined in the false narrative” 
Images only “described images associated with the false event, but those images need not have been experienced as memories” 
*Ost, Foster, Costall, & 
Bull (2005) 
Full memory “reported remembering the suggested event; …agreed with and/or incorporated the information clues (prompts) into the 
memory report; …reported more information than the information clues (prompts)” 
 Partial memory “reported that they remembered the event but, for example, provided no more information than had been provided in the 
prompts, or indicated that they were unsure it was a real memory…” 
*Strange, Wade, Hayne 
(2008) 
False memory “…claimed to remember the event and reported at least two specific details about it” 
Image “…speculated about at least three different aspects of the event” 
Otgaar, Scoboria, & 
Smeets (2013) 
False memory “Participants who indicated ‘remembering’ the event and provided additional event-related details” 
  
 
Note:  In all of the studies, cases that did not meet one of the definitions were included in a ‘no memory’ category. * Indicates studies included in the current analysis.
Table 2. Items used to code memory transcripts  
 
Item Scale Definition 
Acceptance 
of suggested 
details 
Which of the following best describes the participant’s 
acceptance of the specific details of the event that were 
provided to them, at the end of the entire process? 0 
Outright rejection; 1 Minimal acceptance / Accept 
parts, reject parts; 2 Moderate acceptance / Acceptance 
with no active rejection; 3 Complete acceptance 
Consider the specific details that were suggested to the 
participant. To what degree do they accept just these 
details at the end of the entire process? Do they accept 
all of the material as accurate, do they accept some 
parts but not other parts, do they struggle with 
accepting it, are they unsure? 
Elaboration Does the participant provide any more information 
beyond what was provided to them? No / Yes 
[If Yes] 
Elaboration amount: How much elaboration is 
provided? 1 Minimal; 2 Moderate; 3 Substantial 
Elaboration related: How closely related is the 
additional information to the information provided? 0 
Not related; 1 Minimally related; 2 Moderately related; 
3 Highly related 
Does the participant include any additional information 
beyond the original information provided to them when 
describing the event (the material suggested)? 
(examples: describing what occurred before or after, 
adding new characters, new objects, new scenes, new 
actions, adding details to the information provided, 
etc.) 
Imagery Does the participant generate and/or experience any 
sensory images of the event? No / Yes 
 [If Yes] 
Imagery amount: How many sensory images does the 
participant experience? 1 Small amount of imagery 
(about 1 image); 2 Moderate amount of imagery (about 
2-4 images; 3 High amount of imagery (about 5 or 
more images) 
Imagery quality: What is the quality of the best sensory 
image experienced?1 Weak imagery; 2 Moderate 
imagery; 3 Strong (vivid) imagery 
When participants envision the event, do they 
experience any images? That is, do they appear to be 
perceiving the way things looked, sounded, smelled, or 
felt? 
 
Coherence How coherent is the participant’s description of the 
event (how well does it hang together as an organized 
narrative)? 
0 Not coherent; No information; 1 Minimally coherent; 
2 Somewhat coherent; 3 Highly coherent 
How organized and coherent is the participant’s 
description of the event (no matter the amount of 
information that is described)? Does it make logical 
sense? Does it flow? Or is their description broken up 
into chunks that don’t necessarily fit together? Are 
there gaps between the reported series of events? Rate 
the entire transcript as a whole. 
Emotional 
content 
Does the participant include any emotional content 
when discussing the event?  No / Yes 
[If Yes] 
Emotion amount: How much emotional content is 
present? 1 Little emotional content (about 1 reference); 
2 Moderate emotional content (about 2-4 references); 3 
High emotional content (about 5 or more references) 
Emotion engagement: Which of the following describes 
the emotional engagement in whatever amount of 
emotional content is present?0 No engagement; 1 Weak 
engagement; 2 Moderate engagement; 3 Strong 
engagement 
Definition: Does the participant include emotional 
material in their description of the past event? (eg., “I 
felt…”, “We were very excited…”, “I might have 
felt…”, “Someone in that situation would probably 
feel…” etc.). If there is any use of emotional state 
(worry, sad, happy, loved, hurt, enthusiastic, rage, 
anger, etc.), emotional expression (yelled, screamed, 
laughed, cried, zany), or other related words such as 
“feeling”, “mood”, “temper”, and so forth, then this 
should be coded as “Yes”. 
 
Judged 
memory 
Do you think that the participant feels they have a 
memory for the specific event? 0 No; 1 Unsure; 2 Yes, 
part; 3 Yes, for entire event 
Considering all of the information available to you, do 
you feel that the participant has a memory for the 
event? Partial means that some but not all of the 
provided information is endorsed as remembered; Full 
means that all of the provided information is endorsed 
as remembered. 
Event 
rejection 
Does the participant state that they do not have a 
memory / do not remember (or similar) at the end of the 
procedure? No / Yes 
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Table 3. Correlations between independent judges’ ratings for key memory features and the 
judged memory variable. 
 
 
 
Note: Each feature was coded as absent or present by a different pair of raters. Spearman’s rho [95% confidence 
intervals]. N = 423. ‘Judged memory’ was coded as partial memory or full memory by one pair of raters. 
 
  
 Acceptance Elaboration Imagery 
Judged 
memory, 
partial or full 
Judged 
memory, full 
Acceptance present 1.00 .56 
[.49,.63] 
.50 
[.41,.57] 
.54 
[.47,.60] 
.39 
[.32,.46] 
Elaboration present  1.00 .73 
[.65,.81] 
.35 
[.29,.40] 
.18 
[.12,.23] 
Imagery present   1.00 .38 
[.33,.43] 
.21 
[.16,.26] 
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Table 4. Definitions of ‘memory’ and associated mean ratings on other judged variables. 
 
Acceptance Elaboration Imagery N 
Emotion intensity 
Mean [95% CI] 
Coherence 
Mean [95% CI] 
Judged memory 
Mean [95% CI] 
1  None - - 153 0.06 [0.02,0.11] 0.16  [0.09, 0.24] 0.03  [0.00, 0.08] 
2  Any - - 270 0.45 [0.36,0.55] 1.33  [1.22, 1.46] 1.09  [0.97, 1.23] 
3  Moderate - - 173 0.60 [0.49,0.71] 1.65  [1.51, 1.78] 1.43  [1.29, 1.58] 
4  Moderate Any Any 137 0.63 [0.51,0.76] 1.72  [1.58, 1.86] 1.49  [1.34, 1.65] 
5  Moderate Mod Mod 91 0.86 [0.70,1.03] 2.08  [1.93, 2.23] 1.86  [1.65, 2.06] 
6  High Mod Mod 44 1.07 [0.83,1.32] 2.30  [2.12, 2.48] 2.05  [1.76, 2.35] 
 
Note: Each line indicates a different combination of the Acceptance, Elaboration and Imagery judged variables. 
Starting with line 2, all subsequent lines are a sub-set of the preceding group (e.g., the 173 on line 3 are a subset of 
the 270 on line 2). Range for all variables is 0 to 3. See Table 5 for the Ns associated with each of the final groups. 
Cases unique to Line 4 were labeled “Partial false memory”; those unique to Line 5, “Full false memory”; and those 
on Line 6, “Robust false memory”. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for remaining judged items by coded memory category. 
 Judged variable 
Category 
Emotion 
amount 
Emotion 
intensity Coherence 
Elaboration 
relationship 
Imagery 
quality 
Judged 
memory 
No memory  
(N = 153) 
0.12 
[0.07,0.19] 
0.07 
[0.03,0.11] 
0.17 
[0.10,0.25] 
0.65 
[0.48,0.81] 
0.42 
[0.32,0.52] 
0.03 
[0.00,0.08] 
Accept 
(N = 97) 
0.33 
[0.20,0.46] 
0.14 
[0.07,0.25] 
0.63 
[0.47,0.79] 
1.48 
[1.24,1.72] 
0.97 
[0.81,1.14] 
0.36 
[0.25,0.51] 
Partial false memory  
(N = 36) 
0.64 
[0.36,0.91] 
0.28 
[0.11,0.47] 
1.19 
[.94,1.44] 
2.70 
[2.51,2.86] 
1.31 
[1.14,1.53] 
1.22 
[.86,1.56] 
Full false memory  
(N = 46) 
0.98 
[0.72,1.22] 
0.65 
[0.41,0.89] 
1.91 
[1.65,2.19] 
2.64 
[2.45,2.81] 
1.98 
[1.76,2.19] 
1.86 
[1.67,2.06] 
Robust false memory  
(N = 47) 
1.30 
[1.02,1.60] 
1.09 
[0.80,1.39] 
2.40 
[2.23,2.57] 
2.87 
[2.60,2.91] 
2.00 
[1.79,2.19] 
2.38 
[2.10,2.62] 
Rejected  
(N = 44) 
0.75 
[0.47,1.03] 
0.36 
[0.18,0.56] 
1.25 
[1.02,1.49] 
2.54 
[2.34,2.75] 
1.50 
[1.32,1.70] 
0.00 
[0.00,0.00] 
 
Notes: All scales ranged from 0 to 3. Means and 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 6. Correlations between judged categories and suggestive techniques. 
 
 
Judged item 
Idiosyncratic  
self-relevant 
information provided 
in suggestion 
Suggested event  
imagined during 
retrieval procedure 
Doctored photo 
depicts suggested 
event 
Emotion amount  .09 [-0.01,0.18] .24 [0.15,0.31] .02 [-0.07,0.11] 
Emotion engagement .02 [-0.07,0.12] .21 [0.12,0.28] -.05 [-0.14,0.04] 
Coherence .23 [0.14,0.33] .38 [0.30,0.46] -.12 [-0.21,-0.02] 
Imagery present .26 [0.17,0.35] .24 [0.15,0.33] -.10 [-0.19,0.00] 
Imagery amount  .30 [0.21,0.39] .26 [0.16,0.35] -.19 [-0.28,-0.10] 
Imagery quality  .28 [0.19,0.36] .28 [0.20,0.36] -.16 [-0.24,-0.07] 
Elaboration present .25 [0.16,0.34] .23 [0.14,0.33] -.09 [-0.17,0.02] 
Elaboration amount  .19 [0.11,0.29] .27 [0.18,0.36] -.14 [-0.23,-0.05] 
Elaboration relationship  .16 [0.06,0.25] .20 [0.10,0.29] -.06 [-0.15,0.04] 
Accept event .19 [0.10,0.29] .27 [0.18,0.36] .01 [-0.10,0.10] 
Judged memory .16 [0.07,0.26] .21 [0.12,0.30] -.11 [-0.20,-0.01] 
 
Notes: Study characteristics coded as 0 Not present, 1 Present. Coefficients are Spearman’s rho. N = 423; error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapping 1000 samples. Correlations which do not include zero in the 
confidence interval are in bold. Range for all variables is 0 to 3. 
 
  
RUNNING HEAD: Mega-analysis of False Memory Reports… 53 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Final categorization of 423 participants’ memory reports.  
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Figure 2. Participants’ mean subjective ratings by false memory category. Remember/know and rehearsal ratings 
were available for 75.9% of the combined sample; Reliving ratings were available for 58.6% of the sample. Ns by 
group for the remember/know and rehearsal items are: 30, 123, 67, 34, 39, 28. Ns by group for the reliving item are: 
17, 106, 43, 24, 39, 19. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals on group means. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of memory reports within each memory category for cases with (left bars) and without (right 
bars) key suggestive techniques (idiosyncratic information, imagination, a suggestive narrative that was not 
accompanied by a photo depicting the suggested event). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals on proportions. 
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Figure 4. Frequency of autobiographical belief ratings for suggested events at the end of the studies on the 8-point 
scale (n 116). 
 
 
 
